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1 Traditional  explanations of  the Religious  Right  in the United States  have often been
guided by its sudden rise in 1980 and feelings of disapproval. Daniel Williams, professor of
history at the University of West Georgia, published a welcome new contribution to this
body of literature by placing this phenomenon in a much longer historical context. His
well-written and careful book depoliticizes what is often viewed as a negative influence in
American politics, and thus avoids the emotional connotations.
2 The common view is  that  conservative Christians  rebelled against  the liberal  sixties,
which abolished school prayer, liberalized abortion, and forced integration. This would
have energized them to rise from their political slumber and hijack the Republican Party.
Only partly true, says historian Williams in a candid argument. Conservative Christians
had been active in politics long before. In the 1920s the battle lines between modern and
traditional Christians were drawn. The second group abandoned the Democratic Party
when it nominated a Roman Catholic candidate. However, they were far from ready to
exclusively join the Republican Party. They had too many ties to the Southern Democrats
and were far from unified. During World War II, the separatist fundamentalists in the
North reconnected again and had rediscovered their confidence in the military force of
federal government. These two developments set the stage for the realignment. 
3 Williams aptly describes how after World War II two developments—a religious and a
political one—prepared the way to the exclusive relationship between Republicans and
conservative Christians. A growing self-awareness of the neo Evangelicals prepared the
first move in the 1940s and 1950s. This revitalization did not immediately lead to a strong
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power bloc, because of internal (fundamentalist) disagreements about the inerrancy of
scripture and the civil rights issue. In the 1960s their priorities changed, because they
realized that secularism was a greater danger to the alleged Christian character of the
nation than a Catholic president.  Simultaneously,  the vigor of the Civil  Rights period
evaporated and allowed the Southern and Northern faction to reunite. 
4 At the political side, Republicans successfully reeled in conservative Christians in their
Cold War rhetoric, which cleared the way for more strong moral language in contested
issues. When the Democratic Party took a left turn, the Republicans moved right and
entered the South to build a new powerbase. Since the South was Bible Belt area, the
Republican  leaders  had  to  learn  a  religious  way  of  talking  politics.  Simultaneously,
Evangelicals and Fundamentalists realized that the Republican Party was their natural
ally. Despite disappointments and disagreements, they had and have no other place to go.
Similarly, the Republican Party could not afford to lose the Christian Right’s support,
which would give it 40 per cent of the vote. Thus a political wedlock came into being. The
novelty  of  Williams’  research is  the  careful  reconstruction  of  a  century  of  political-
religious interaction, which led to this amazingly strong marriage. They were anti New
Deal,  but very patriotic,  moving towards a form of Christian nationalism. Theological
ideas about the end-times and political pressure of the Cold War gave them a sense of
urgency  and  clashed  with  the  perceived  obstacles  in  the  Kennedy  years.  Kennedy’s
election  brought  the  various  factions  together  because  they  feared  Democratic
domination. 
5 Perhaps the crucial chapter is the one on the 1960s. It gives a sophisticated analysis of the
growing God-gap between the two parties, which was far from a solid opposition. In this
decade a number of changes brought Evangelicals together. Many Baptists agreed that
the ban on school prayers was a farce and that the schools could do without this often
empty ritual.  Federal  civil  rights  measures  caused a  second regional  division among
traditional Christians. Southerners supported Goldwater in frustration with their loss of
autonomy caused by civil rights legislation. Northern Evangelicals supported the Johnson
initiatives.  Only  when  the  South  gave  up  its  resistance  to  the  civil  rights  act,  the
conservative Christians could act  as  a  voting block.  Vietnam,  sex education, and the
increased concern for America’s future opened Evangelicals up for Nixon’s promise of law
and  order.  They  feared  secularization  but  also  expected  renewal.  They  shared  the
conviction that sound morality at home would create strength abroad. Evangelicals had
been on the lookout for a candidate whom they could embrace and Nixon courted them
openly.  The  promising  combination  however,  was  less  stable  than  foreseen,  as  Billy
Graham found out, when he had to pay a high price for this attachment to Nixon when
the Watergate scandal boomeranged on his prestige. 
6 Williams describes how the unification among fundamentalists and Evangelicals resulted
in a growing split between believers and non-believers. This new alignment diminished
the middle ground and fanned polarization.  A key example was that originally many
Baptists  supported  abortion  rules  for  therapeutic  reasons,  but  later,  when  they  had
embraced the idea that politics was needed to save America, they converted to a radical
rejection. The great enigma of this period is that Jimmy Carter, Mr. Evangelical, could not
tie the evangelical vote to the Democratic Party, even though Gerald Ford was too liberal
for the average evangelical.  Carter’s  combination of  personal  piety and liberal  policy
could  not  charm  his  fellow  believers,  because  during  his  presidency  an  ideological
underpinning took root: secular humanism was the arch enemy and had to be fought on
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all fronts: in the schools, where “neutral” values actually undermined parental authority
and traditional religion; in politics, that often pressured these changes; in gender and
sexual  relations,  which campaigned for “unnatural” equality (forcefully supported by
President Carter); and culture in general. More and more evangelical groups joined the
fight.  The  focus  centered  around  abortion,  especially  when  conservatives  won  the
leadership of the Southern Baptist Convention and found a bridge to Catholics. A smart
mobilization  campaign  generated  a  strong  voting  bloc.  Though  internal  dissent  and
exclusivist views continued to trouble the direction and cohesion, the idea of a liberal
victory in 1980 spurred their efforts to elect Ronald Reagan. 
7 The lack of  a political  philosophy undergirding political  action fit  into the American
political system. The leaders spent most energy in organizing, not in critically thinking
through political issues. They did not adopt any of the political ideas of their former
champion William Jennings  Bryan about  sharing  power  and protection  of  the  weak.
Evangelicals spent much more energy in mobilizing than in thinking through the issues.
This opened the door for ludicrous radical proposals which undermined their power. For
example, the failed candidacy of Robertson hurt the religious right, and they became a
minority again. The Christian Coalition moved the Republican Party to the right, but in
the  long  run  could  not  keep  this  loose  coalition  together.  A  substantial  part  of  its
constituency  doubted  the  wisdom  of  its  close  involvement  in  politics,  while  others
radicalized even further. The conclusion is that the conservative Christians were moved
by fear rather than hope.
8 The main contribution of this well-balanced, persuasive and beautifully written book is
that it proves that the making of the Christian Right was not the result of single factors
such as the Christian Coalition or of Jerry Falwell, but the outcome of a long tradition of
shifting coalitions, expectations, and disappointments. Why did Evangelicals enter the
political arena in the 1970s? Because they had outgrown the mainline churches and self-
confidently could shape a political bloc, with new causes and handsome means, both in
funds and in a broad all-media subculture. New regulation for raising money aided the
conservative  PAC’s,  which  trained  other  groups  in  fundraising  techniques.  The  new
leaders fanned the distrust of the federal government and connected various issues. The
desire to clean up America was larger than the desire to stay separate and pure. It were
the Evangelicals who sought out Reagan for this task and he responded well.
9 There are  only  some minor points  to  take up with the text.  The author  shows how
presidential candidates like Nixon, Ford, and Carter lost or gained political support from
the Evangelicals and it would have helped to know what the candidate gained or lost at
the other, liberal, side of the spectrum. In Carter’s case, he did not want to give up the
liberals in his party, because they might likely flee to Edward Kennedy. Such an account
could have added to the understanding of how political strategies increased the divide.
One paradox remains:  while Evangelicals fostered a strong belief that sound personal
morality of a candidate was necessary for healthy policies, it remains odd that Nixon and
Reagan,  who were  so  far  removed from the  evangelical  ideal,  continued to  be  their
favorite sons. 
10 Finally, a more explicit political analysis of the development of new pressure groups, such
as  the  populists,  prohibitionists,  and  Catholic  voters,  could  have  connected  this
development  of  the  Evangelicals  in  the  larger  story  of  dissent  in  American political
history. But that hardly counts as a criticism. Researchers should be grateful that they
have a solid and careful volume like this which can be the basis for new connections.
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